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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 47, Number 3, 1972
ARTICLE
DISCOVERY IN WASHINGTON
Philip A. Trautman*
Two decades have passed since the Washington Supreme Court, in
1951, adopted practically verbatim the federal rules governing the dis-
covery process. The federal rules themselves had been promulgated
earlier by the United States Supreme Court in 1938. While pretrial
depositions, interrogatories to parties, inspection of books and docu-
ments, and physical examination of parties were provided for -in
Washington prior to 1951, such devices were much less comprehen-
sive than those under the federal rules as to persons, materials and
subjects within the scope of proper inquiry.'
By the time the present rules were adopted, it had already been es-
tablished that the promulgation of such rules was properly within the
sphere of the Washington Supreme Court's power. In 1928 in State ex
rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Company v. Superior Court,2 a rule of
court relating to the taking of depositions was sought to be invali-
dated. It was held that such rules related to procedural rather than
substantive matters and thus were permissible under a statute author-
izing the court to make rules relating to pleading, practice and proce-
dure, 3 and that such authorization was not an unconstitutional delega-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1952, J.D., 1954, Univer-
sity of Washington.
1. For a discussion of the changes effected in the former Washington procedure
by the adoption of the federal discovery rules see Green, Procedural Progress in
Washington, 26 WASH. L. REV. 87, 100-07 (1951). See also McGugart v. Brumback,
77 Wn.2d 441, 463 P.2d 140 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
2. 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928).
3. The pertinent statutory provisions authorizing rules of court are WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 2.04.180-.210 (1961).
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tion of legislative power. The case has served as the touchstone for
determining the constitutionality of rules of court in Washington and,
particularly for present purposes, of discovery rules.
The reasons for the promulgation of modern discovery rules are
numerous.4 Perhaps the chief purpose of modern discovery devices is
the elimination of the problems resulting from each party proceeding
his own way in the preparation and investigation of his case without
the opportunity of knowing and evaluating the position of the other
party. Without discovery the outcome of litigation turned too often on
the tactical skills and techniques of attorneys rather than the reality of
the situation. Through discovery of the other party's facts, witnesses,
documents, and physical and mental condition, surprise and entrap-
ment at the trial would be lessened. Trials would be decided upon the
facts rather than by the skills of counsel. By more clearly defining the
real issues and eliminating false issues, trials would be shortened. The
number of witnesses and documents would be reduced. The hope was
that in many instances the entire trial would be avoided by virtue of
the greater likelihood of pretrial settlements when the realities were
known by all the parties. Earlier disposition of issues, or of the entire
case by summary judgment or settlements, would reduce not only the
burden on the state but the cost to parties as well. While recent studies
suggest that discovery does not always produce all of these desired
results (for example, discovery does not appear to produce more fre-
quent settlements or save substantial court time in shortening or
avoiding trials), on balance it is working and has the support of the
bar and commentators. 5
The purpose of this article is to review the developments in Wash-
ington under the discovery rules and to point up particularly some of
the more common problem areas. This is appropriate not only be-
cause of the passage of time and accumulation of experience under the
rules, but also because of the recent adoption of new federal discovery
rules on July 1, 1970. The new federal rules are intended to remedy
defects and clarify ambiguities existing under the 1938 federal dis-
4. A good listing of the advantages, and disadvantages, of discovery depositions
is stated in H. HICKAM & T. SCANLON, PREPARATION FOR TRIAL 92-110 (1963).
5. For an excellent discussion of the actual workings of discovery under the
original federal rules and the bar's appraisal thereof see W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DIS-
COVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968). The results of the study reported in this
book provided much of the material used for the redrafting of the federal rules. See
also Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 481 (1968).
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covery rules, the ones now basically controlling in Washington. One
may anticipate growing discussion and eventual promulgation of part
or all of the new federal rules in Washington in accord with Washing-
ton's general tendency to adopt the federal rules. This article will dis-
cuss some of the more important provisions of the new federal rules
and the way in which their adoption and implementation would affect
present Washington discovery practice and procedure.
The discussion in this article relates to discovery in civil cases. It
was decided soon after the promulgation of the present discovery rules
that they applied only to civil procedure.6 Discovery in criminal cases,
rather than being governed by any particular set of rules, is a matter
deemed to rest peculiarly in the discretion of the trial court.7 While
the trend seems to be in the direction of more liberal allowances of
pretrial discovery in criminal cases, such discovery has not yet
reached the limits provided under modem civil discovery rules.8
I. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
The pertinent general provision as to scope of discovery under Wash-
ington practice is as follows:9
Unless otherwise ordered by the court .... the deponent may be exam-
ined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the sub-
ject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of
any other party....
Prior to the adoption of this provision, discovery was limited to
facts which were material to a party's own side of the controversy; one
could not inquire into the other party's case. 10 The limiting effect of
this approach was demonstrated by Hill v. Hill," in which the plain-
tiff alleged a personal assault by the defendant. The defendant,
through interrogatories, sought to require the plaintiff to state what
6. State v. Christensen, 40 Wn.2d 329, 242 P.2d 755 (1952).
7. State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 466 P.2d 120 (1970).
8. State v. Smith, 77 Wn.2d 267, 461 P.2d 873 (1969). See Revelle and Ashbaugh,
Criminal Pre-Trial Discovery--A Proposal, 3 GONZAGA L. REV. 48 (1968).
9. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(b). The new federal rule 26(b)(1) contains basi-
cally the same language.
10. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Lotta Mills Tire Co., 139 Wash. 159, 245 P. 921
(1926).
11. 126Wash. 560,219P. 18(1923).
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injuries were received, how long her recovery took, whether the as-
sault occurred in her home, and the names of any persons who saw
the assault.
Discovery of such information by the defendant was denied since it
related to the plaintiff's case.1 2 Under the present Washington rules
such information could clearly be obtained as it relates "to the claim
or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts."' 3
Although the scope of appropriate subject matter for discovery was
considerably extended by the rules, there are, of course, still limita-
tions. One is that the matter not be privileged. An early example is
Cully v. Northern Pacific Railway14 in which, in an action against
a railroad company for personal injuries to an employee, interroga-
tories seeking to compel the defendant to produce an accident
report and certain confidential correspondence were held improper
since such communications were privileged.
The most litigated question in recent times relates to the physi-
cian-patient privilege. As will be discussed later, it is possible for a de-
fendant to obtain a physical examination of a plaintiff under Civil
Rule 35. But suppose that the defendant wishes instead to take a dep-
osition of plaintiffs doctor. In Bond v. Independent Order of Forest-
ers,15 the court held that the bringing of a personal-injury action does
not, by itself, constitute a waiver by the plaintiff of the physi-
cian-patient privilege afforded by statute. The Bond court also held
12. The court reasoned as follows: ". . . since they were propounded by the defense,
they must call for matters material to the defense. Those here propounded had no
tendency in that direction. They rather required the plaintiff to state with particularity
what evidence she intended to give in support of her complaint.- Id. at 561, 219 P. at
18.
Other examples of this approach are State ex rel. Bronson v. Superior Court. 194
Wash. 339, 77 P.2d 997 (1938); Schmit v. Campbell, 140 Wash. 376, 249 P. 487
(1926); Brooke v. Boyd, 80 Wash. 213, 141 P. 357 (1914). See also Gose, The
Scope of Interrogatories in Washington, I WASH. L. REV. 119 (1926). Therein it is
stated: "As under the ancient practice a mere fishing bill was not allowed, so under
the statutes the scope of interrogatories is limited to facts material to the interrogating
party's own title or cause of action." Id. at 120. The author also states that "these
statutes give both parties to an action the right to propound interrogatories to discover
evidence in support of their own case .. ." Id. at 122-23.
13. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(b).
14. 35 Wash. 241, 77 P. 202 (1904).
15. 69 Wn.2d 879, 421 P.2d 351 (1966), noted in 42 WASH. L. REV. 1107 (1967).
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that the plaintiff's testimony in a pretrial deposition, as to the nature
and extent of his injuries, did not constitute a waiver of the privilege
where the testimony was in response to defendant's pretrial subpoena
since plaintiff was being examined as an adverse witness in compli-
ance with the subpoena and rules of court governing discovery.
In Phipps v. Sasser,16 the court again concluded that there was no
automatic waiver of the privilege by the commencement of a per-
sonal-injury action or some other particular step in the litigation so
that the defendant could then depose the plaintiffs doctor. Rather, a
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis as to whether the
plaintiff intends to waive his privilege, and when it appears that he ul-
timately will do so in a particular case the waiver may be accelerated
so that the defendant may take the deposition of the plaintiffs physi-
cians to prepare to meet their testimony. The court stated that while
the inclusion of a physician on a list of the plaintiffs witnesses might
evidence an intention to waive the privilege and justify acceleration of
the waiver, under the particular circumstances the plaintiff did not
waive the privilege by voluntarily making available certain privileged
information in the form of medical reports and hospital records with
the expectation of securing a speedy settlement of the litigation. 7
A second limitation is that the matter to be examined must be rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. The Advi-
sory Committee's Note to new federal rule 26(b)(1), which continues
to use relevancy to the subject matter as the guideline, states that since
decisions for discovery purposes are made well in advance of trial a
flexible treatment of relevance is required.' 8 Participation in discov-
ery, whether voluntarily or under court order, is said not to be a con-
cession or determination of relevance for purposes of trial. This is
suggested by the provision in Washington Civil Rule 26(b) that, "It is
not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the
16. 74 Wn.2d 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968).
17. See 2 L. ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 177, at 59 (2d ed., 1970 Supp.).
Orland views the case as adopting the accelerated waiver principle applied by the
federal courts.
18. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1967) [hereinafter cited
as ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTES].
See also M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN & H. SMIT, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
CASES AND MATERIALS 650-52 (2d ed., 1970). This contains a "Note on Relevance"
which briefly mentions the more common relevancy problems.
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trial if the testimony appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence."
A recurring problem, which has sharply split the courts, is whether
the defendant's liability insurance coverage is subject to discovery
when the insurance coverage is not itself admissible and does not bear
directly on any other issue in the case. 9 There is no Washington appel-
late opinion resolving the matter 2 0 and consequently the trial courts
have been free to go their own way. A new Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure provides specifically for discovery of insurance coverage: 21
A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any in-
surance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance
business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may
be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments
made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning the insurance
agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence at
trial.
Rather than continuing the present practice of allowing each trial
judge to make his own determination, with resultant diversity
throughout the state, it would be preferable for the Washington court
to provide specifically one way or the other as to discovery of insur-
ance coverage.
In the federal courts some very difficult problems have involved
attempted discovery of materials obtained or prepared by the adverse
party, his attorney, or other representative in anticipation of litigation
or in preparation for trial. Original federal rule 34 made no explicit
provision for dealing with such materials. As a result, the federal
courts struggled with the requirement of the rule that documents,
papers and the like could be obtained only on a showing of "good
cause," and with the work-product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor22
whereby some showing of necessity or justification was required. 23
A new federal rule deals explicitly with trial preparation materials
and seeks to clarify much of the confusion that has previously existed.
19. See 40 WASH. L. REV. 347 (1965), which suggests that the weight of authority
has held that insurance contracts are not relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action.
20. But see Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wn.2d 195, 381 P.2d 966 (1963).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
22. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
23. See Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1269 (1969).
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Federal rule 23(b)(3) provides for discovery of documents and tang-
ible things
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking-discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the re-
quired showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclo-
sure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litiga-
tion.
The rule also provides that a party may obtain a statement con-
cerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party.
Any other person who has made such a statement may likewise obtain
his own statement.
Washington has long had a specific provision in point. As originally
adopted in January, 1951, it provides that:24
The court need not order the production or inspection of any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, in-
demnitor or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for
trial. The court shall not order the production or inspection of any
writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions or
legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the written conclu-
sions of an expert.
The Washington rule also protects the written conclusions of ex-
perts. It has been held that the rule applies to deny counsel the right to
examine written reports of an expert at the trial itself. In State v. Cor-
vallis Sand & Gravel Co.,25 counsel wished to examine a written report
of the opponent's expert witness during cross-examination for possible
impeachment purposes- in the event that the report was inconsistent
with the-testimony. The court stated that the rule placed such reports
out of reach of opposing counsel unless something occurred during
the-trial to warrant their production. Since nothing relating to the re-
24. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(b).
25. 69 Wn.2d 24,416 P.2d 675 (1966).
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port was opened up on direct examination, no inquiry in regard there-
to was proper on cross-examination.
The new federal rule, 26(b)(4), provides in considerable detail for
the discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts which were
acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial. A party
may, through interrogatories, require any other party to identify each
person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at
trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to tes-
tify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each
opinion. Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other
means subject to such restrictions as to scope and as to payment of
fees and expenses as the court deems appropriate. 26 If the expert has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation
of litigation or preparation for trial but is not expected to be called as
a witness at trial, discovery is permitted only as provided in federal
rule 35(b), which will be discussed later, or upon a showing of excep-
tional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by
other means.2 7
Some have objected to such broad allowance of discovery of expert
knowledge or opinion on the ground that one party will benefit un-
fairly at the expense of another's experts. To remedy this, it is prov-
ided that unless manifest injustice would result, the court shall require
that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for
time spent in responding to discovery.2 8 Further, provision is made for
the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the
fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining
facts and opinions from the expert.
II. WHETHER TO MAKE DISCOVERY
Before considering each of the discovery tools individually, there is
the general question of whether any discovery should be undertaken.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). Background material for the new federal rule
may be found in Comment, Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem and a Pro-
posed FRCP Solution, 53 MINN. L. REV. 785 (1969), and Long, Discovery and Ex-
perts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REV. 665 (1964).
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This is basically a tactical determination involving the balancing of
the many advantages of learning about the opponent's case with the
possible disadvantages of enabling the opponent to learn a little
about one's own case by the nature of the discovery, alerting the op-
ponent to the possibility of using his own discovery, and incurring
certain costs of discovery.
One disadvantage has been removed by the recent case of Mc-
Gugart v. Brumback.29 The question presented was whether the sub-
mission of written interrogatories to the plaintiff concerning his al-
leged transactions with the decedent was a waiver of defendant es-
tate's right under the deadman's statute to bar testimony by plaintiff
at the trial. In a long series of cases the court had held that when a
personal representative of a deceased person caused the pretrial depo-
sition of the adverse party to be taken and the deposition reached al-
leged transactions with the decedent, such inquiry constituted a waiver
of the bar of the deadman's statute with respect to such transactions. 30
In McGugart the court said there was no relevant basis for distin-
guishing between written interrogatories and depositions in the
problem presented. In a 5-4 decision the court proceeded to overrule
its prior holdings, relying upon the liberalization of pretrial discovery
procedures that had occurred over the years. The court concluded
that the finding of waiver of the deadman's statute discouraged per-
sonal representatives from using the discovery process, a result con-
trary to the purpose of modern, liberal discovery. 31
The McGugart court relied heavily upon Civil Rule 26(f), which
removed another potential disadvantage to taking depositions. This
rule specifies that a party is not deemed to make a person his own wit-
ness by taking his deposition. Therefore, that party neither vouches
for the testimony of the deponent nor is prohibited from impeaching
his testimony at the trial. A contrary position would inhibit the very
purpose of depositions-discovery. Instead, it is the introduction in
evidence of a deposition, other than for the purpose of contradicting
or impeaching the witness, that makes the deponent one's witness. 32
29. 77 Wn.2d 441, 463 P.2d 140 (1969).
30. Hall v. American Friends Service Committee, Inc., 74 Wn.2d 467, 445 P.2d
616 (1968); Miller v. O'Brien, 17 Wn.2d 753, 137 P.2d 525 (1943); American Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. Calvert, 186 Wash. 29, 56 P.2d 1307 (1936).
31. The case is noted with approval in Hayes, Discovery-Non-Waiver of Dead-
man's Statute, 5 GONZAGA L. REV. 302 (1970).
32. The introduction of the deposition of the adverse party does not make him
one's witness. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(f).
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Thus the time for determining whether a deponent is one's witness is
when, and if, his deposition is introduced. On the other hand, the cri-
tical time for determining the competency of a deponent is at the
taking of a deposition rather than at its introduction into evidence.
Thus, if a deponent is competent at the time of his deposition, the
deposition is admissible insofar as that matter is concerned, even
though the deponent is no longer competent at the time of trial.3 3 Pre-
sumably the same principle applies as to answers to written interroga-
tories.
III. DISCOVERY DEVICES
A. Depositions
1. To Whom Directed
The most common, and ordinarily most useful, discovery device is
the oral deposition. A party may take the deposition of any person for
the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for
both purposes. 34 The deponent may be a hostile or friendly witness, 3 -5
the adverse party, or one's self.36
The many advantages to be derived from depositions of hostile wit-
nesses or the adverse party, such as discovery of his position and the
facts known by him and as a record of his position for possible later
impeachment, will often call for the taking of such depositions. Ordi-
narily, however, one would not wish to take the deposition of a
friendly witness or of one's own party. It is not necessary to discover
what is known nor would one ordinarily wish to put such a person's
testimony on the record. But if the person were ill or about to leave
the community, then the deposition might be desirable to perpetuate
the testimony for trial.
33. McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wn.App. 348, 467 P.2d 868 (1970).
34. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(a). New federal rule 30(a) continues the same
broad application.
35. As an example of the possibility of taking the deposition of a child, see
Garratt v. Dailey. 46 Wn.2d 197. 279 P.2d 1091 (1955). In Garrat, the suggestion
was made that, if necessary to protect a child from misleading and confusing ques-
tioning, the deposition might be taken under the supervision of the court. In the
particular instance, however, the trial court's refusal to allow the deposition was not
found to be prejudicial.
36. See Aircraft Radio Industries, Inc. v. M. V. Palmer, Inc., 45 Wn.2d 737, 277
P.2d 737 (1954).
418
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The attendance of persons for the purpose of taking their deposi-
tions may be compelled by the use of a subpoena. 37 Ordinarily the
subpoena will be issued by the attorney though it may be issued by the
officer before whom the testimony is to be taken.38 Geographic limits
are prescribed, in that a resident of the county in which a deposition is
to be taken may be required to attend only in that county or in the
county where he is employed or transacts his business, or at such other
convenient place as is fixed by court order. A non-resident of the
county may be required to attend only in the county wherein he is
served with a subpoena, or within forty miles from the place of service
or at such other convenient place as is fixed by court order. 39 It is not
necessary that a subpoena be used if one is certain that the deponent
will appear for the deposition. However, it is wise to use it as a protec-
tive measure, particularly with a hostile witness, because if the witness
does not attend and he was not subpoenaed the court may order the
payment of the reasonable expenses incurred by the other party and
his attorney in attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.4.
In addition to subpoenaing the witness, reasonable notice in writing
of not less than three days must be given to every other party to the
action in order to allow the other parties to be represented at the
taking of the deposition.41 The notice must state the time and place
for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to
be examined, if known, and, if the name is not known, a general de-
scription sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to
which he belongs.
A question arises whether, if the deposition of the adverse party is
to be taken, it is necessary to serve him with both a subpoena and a
notice. Prior to the adoption of the present discovery rules, it was nec-
essary that both be served.42 With the adoption of the equivalent of
the federal rules in 1951, there was some uncertainty whether a sub-
poena was still necessary. 43 The uncertainty was removed in 1961
37. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(a).
38. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 45(a)(3).
39. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 45(d)(2).
40. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 30(g)(2). If it is a hardship for a witness to appear
at a particular time or place, he may move for a court order for his protection. See
WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 30(b).
41. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 30(a). New federal rule 30(b)(1) requires reason-
able notice, but does not contain the three-day provision.
42. State ex rel. Onishi v. Superior Court, 30 Wn.2d 348, 191 P.2d 703 (1948).
43. Under the equivalent federal rule, notice, without-a subpoena, is sufficient to
419
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with the adoption of what is now Civil Rule 43(f)(1), which provides
in part: "Attendance of such deponent or witness [meaning party]
may be compelled solely by notice (in lieu of a subpoena) given in the
manner prescribed in Rule 30(a) to opposing counsel of record."
Another area of uncertainty was clarified by a rule adopted in
1961, that is, the problem of one party obtaining discovery from an
adversary located outside the state. One might send written interroga-
tories in accordance with Civil Rule 33 or perhaps go to the other
place and there take the deposition. 44 But a better approach from the
standpoint of what might be learned and of the cost involved might be
to force the adversary to come to the examiner. Can this be done? In
a series of cases prior to 1960 posing the problem to the Washington
court, the conclusion seemed to be that neither party could be forced
to come into the state to have his deposition taken, just as with a wit-
ness. 45 This was changed by the adoption in 1961 of what is now
Civil Rule 43(f)(3), which provides: 46
If a party or a managing agent refuses to attend and testify before the
officer designated to take his deposition or at the trial after notice
served as prescribed in Rule 30(a), the complaint, answer, or reply of
the party may be stricken and judgment taken against the party, and
the contumacious party or managing agent may also be proceeded
against as in other cases of contempt.
This makes it clear that there is now power to order an adverse party to
compel the attendance of the adverse party. Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1944); Peitzmann v. Illmo, 141 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1944).
44. See W,\sHI. ('iv. R. SUPER. ('T. 45(d)(3). which provides. "'When the place of
examination is in another state, territory, or country, the party desiring to take the
deposition may secure the issuance of a subpoena or equivalent process in accordance
with the laws of such state, territory or country to require the deponent to attend
the examination." As to persons before whom depositions may be taken elsewhere in
the United States and in foreign countries see WASh. Civ. R. SUPER. Ci. 28(a) and (b).
45. State ex rel. Onishi v. Superior Court, 30 Wn.2d 348, 191 P.2d 703 (1948).
Onishi held that an out-of-state defendant could not be compelled to appear in the state
for a pretrial oral examination by plaintiff under penalty of having his answer stricken
and being adjudged in default. See Newsom v. West Wind Corp., 41 Wn.2d 375, 249
P.2d 367 (1952); Aircraft Radio Industries, Inc. v. NI. V. Palmer, Inc., 45 Wn.2d 737.
277 P.2d 737 (1954).
46. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 43(0(3) continues:
This rule shall not be construed: (A) to compel any person to answer any
question where such answer might tend to incriminate him; (B) nor to prevent
a party from using a subpoena to compel the attendance of any party or man-
aging agent to give testimony by deposition or at the trial; nor (C) to limit the
applicability of any other sanctions or penalties provided in Rule 37 or otherwise
for failure to attend and give testimony.
420
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be present for a deposition. While the rule applies to both parties, it
may be expected that the court will be more willing to enter an order
against an out-of-state plaintiff than an out-of-state defendant.
An amendment to the federal rules adds a provision which may be
useful in those instances in which one wishes to obtain information
from a corporation or association. 47 A party may name as the depo-
nent a public or private corporation, a partnership, association, or
governmental agency, and designate the matters on which examina-
tion is requested. The organization shall then designate one or more
officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent
to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated,
the matters on which he will testify. The persons so designated shall
testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organiza-
tion. This should prove beneficial to both parties and to a non-party
deponent, since the examining party need not incur the expense and
loss of time of deposing several corporate officials, each of whom dis-
claims knowledge of matters clearly known to the organization, and
the other party or non-party deponent will avoid the situation of many
of its officers and agents being tied up with depositions. The adoption
of such a provision in Washington would be desirable.
2. Time of Deposition
Generally, after an action has been commenced; a deposition may
be taken without leave of court. The one exception is that leave must
be obtained if notice of taking is served by the plaintiff within 20 days
after commencement of the action.48 The purpose of requiring leave
in such circumstances is to protect the defendant by enabling him to
have time to retain counsel and inform himself of the nature of the
suit. Presumably, in seeking leave of court the plaintiff must state
grounds therefor. Examples might be a witness who will not be avail-
able or subject to subpoena after the elapse of the twenty days, or a
motion by defendant which requires a deposition by plaintiff in order
to meet the merits of the motion.
The most common time for the taking of depositions is, of course,
after the action has been commenced. However, there is the possibility
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
48. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(a).
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of taking a deposition before the commencement of an action for the
purpose of perpetuating testimony. This is accomplished by filing a
verified petition in the superior court in the county of the residence of
the expected adverse party, setting forth such matters as the subject
matter of the expected action, the names of the persons to be exam-
ined, and the reasons for desiring to perpetuate the testimony. Service
of the petition is to be made on the expected adverse party, and a
court order must be obtained before a deposition can be taken.4 9 This
procedure might be invoked, for example, to take the deposition of a
person critically injured in an automobile accident with the purpose in
mind of using the deposition in the event of a subsequent wrongful
death suit.
The 1970 amendments to the federal rules made no change in the
procedure relating to depositions before commencement of an action
to perpetuate testimony. Changes were made, however, in the rule re-
lating to depositions after the commencement of an action. New fed-
eral rule 30(a) provides:
Leave of court, granted with or without notice, must be obtained only if
the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of 30
days after service of the summons and complaint upon any defendant
or service made under Rule 4(e), except that leave is not required (i)
if a defendant has served a notice of taking deposition or otherwise
sought discovery, or (2) if special notice is given as provided in subdi-
vision (b)(2) of this rule.
This differs from the old federal rule and the present Washington
rule in several ways. First, whether leave is required is determined by
reference to the time the deposition is to be taken rather than the date
of serving notice of taking. This is a desirable change since the pur-
pose in protecting the defendant is relevant to the time of taking the
deposition, not to the time that notice is served. Second, the time pe-
riod is extended from 20 to 30 days and runs from the service of
summons and complaint rather.than the commencement'of the action. "0
Third, leave is not required if the defendant has sought discovery.
Finally, leave is not required if the plaintiffs notice states that the
person to be examined is about to go out of the district where the ac-
49. WASI. Civ. R. SUPER. Ci. 27(a).
50. As to the meaning of "commencement of the action" under old FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(a), see Application of the Royal Bank of Canada, 33 F.R.D. 296 (1963).
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tion is pending and more than 100 miles from the place of trial, or is
about to go out of the United States, or is bound on a voyage to sea
and will be unavailable for examination unless his deposition is taken
before expiration of the 30-day period. 51
It should be noted that a defendant never has to obtain leave of
court to take a deposition. A plaintiff need not obtain leave after the
20-day period in Washington and the 30-day period in the federal
courts. In the ordinary case then, both parties are free to choose the
time for taking depositions and the decision becomes a tactical, prac-
tical one, rather than one prescribed by court rule.
If one anticipates an early trial date, depositions should be taken
early to assure proper preparation. If, as is more likely, the trial cal-
endar is full, the problem is one of whether to take depositions shortly
after the pleadings or to wait until a time nearer the trial date. The
purpose of the deposition is of obvious consequence. If it is to perpet-
uate testimony, as in the case of a seriously ill witness, one must act
quickly. If the purpose is for discovery, there is greater doubt. By
waiting, one may in the meantime acquire information which will be
useful in conducting a more penetrating examination in the deposi-
tion, and the examination will be able to cover a longer period of
time. This might be important, for example, for a defendant exam-
ining a plaintiff in a personal injury action in order to determine the
extent of the latter's recovery from the incident. On the other hand, an
early deposition gets the deponent committed on the facts before he
has had an extended opportunity to consider the opponent's theory of
the case, and it provides an opportunity for investigating the depo-
nent's statements with the view of obtaining contradicting or im-
peaching testimony.
In the event that one party wishes to obtain whatever advantage
there may be in taking a deposition first, it may be important to act
quickly in giving notice of taking. While there appear to be no Wash-
ington cases in point, the general position adopted by most federal
courts under the old federal rules was that the party who first served
notice of a deposition was entitled to priority as to that deposition.52
To avoid the race for priority which sometimes occurred, a 1970
51. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTES, supra note 18, Rule 30, further discussing
the purposes of the changes.
52. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS
521-22 (1968).
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amendment to the federal rules provides, "Unless the court upon mo-
tion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of
justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any
sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by
deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's
discovery."5 3 There is no comparable rule in Washington at present to
prevent the race.
3. Mechanics of Taking Depositions
The steps to be followed in the taking of a deposition are clearly
stated in Civil Rules 26, 28, 30 and 32, and only a few points need be
stressed. The general interpretation has been that substantial compli-
ance with the rules is sufficient. Thus, the fact that an officer taking a
deposition did not enclose it in a sealed envelope as required by a rule
was not such an irregularity, in the absence of any evidence of tamp-
ering or altering, as to warrant the suppression of the deposition.5 4
Furthermore, if the parties so stipulate in writing, depositions may be
taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in
any manner, and when so taken may be used like other depositions. 55
One change made in the new federal rules relates to the method of
recording the testimony of the deponent. The Washington rule pro-
vides that the testimony shall be taken stenographically. 5( The federal
rule now provides that the court may upon motion order that the testi-
mony be recorded by other than stenographic means-for example,
by mechanical, electronic, or photographic means-in which event
the order shall designate the manner of recording and preserving the
deposition.5 7 This has the desirable effect of facilitating less expensive
procedures. If a party wishes, he may nevertheless arrange to have a
stenographic transcription made at his own expense.
A problem for counsel to decide is what matters must be objected
to at the time of the taking of the deposition to avoid waiver and what
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
54. Kirkpatrick v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 48 Wn.2d 51, 290 P.2d 979
(1955). For cases applying a similar test of substantial rather than strict compliance
under earlier statutes see Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Stotsky. 149
Wash. 246, 77 P.2d 990 (1938); Finn v. Bremerton. 118 Wash. 381, 203 P. 971
(1922): Armstrong v. Yakima Hotel Co., 75 Wash. 477, 135 P. 233 (1913).
55. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 29.
56. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 30(c).
57. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(b)(4).
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may be raised for the first time at the trial if the deposition is offered
in evidence. Civil Rule 32 is clear as to the necessity of prompt objec-
tion to errors in the notice for taking a deposition,5 8 to disqualification
of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken, and to errors
as to completion and return of the deposition. As to errors in the
taking of the deposition, the test is whether the ground of the objec-
tion is one which might have been removed if presented at the time.59
Thus, objections to the competency, relevancy or materiality of testi-
mony ordinarily need not be raised since the officer has no authority
to determine those matters. 60 On the other hand, errors in the form of
the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct
of the parties are waived if objection is not made at the time. Thus, an
objection to an answer in an oral deposition because of unrespon-
siveness61 or to the use of secondary evidence 62 must be made at the
taking of the deposition.
After the deposition is taken and the testimony is transcribed, the
deposition is submitted to the deponent. Prior to his signing, any
changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make are
entered upon the deposition by the officer with a statement of the rea-
sons given by the deponent for making them.63 It is important to note,
however, that both the original and the changed testimony appear in
the deposition, and both are admissible in court under the ordinary
rules of evidence. 64
Brief mention should be made of the possibility of taking deposi-
tions upon written questions rather than by oral examination. Instead
of appearing personally to ask questions of the deponent, written
questions may be given to the officer wio thenTakes the testimony of
the deponent in response to the questions. 65 Due to the advantages of
58. See Rawsthorn v. Rawsthorn, 198 Wash. 471, 88 P.2d 847 (1939); In re
Pompal's Estate, 150 Wash. 242, 272 P. 980 (1928).
59. Ford v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 50 Wn.2d
832, 315 P.2d 299 (1957).
60. See Rosenkranz v. Yakima Valley Bank & Trust Co., 149 Wash. 409, 271 P.
85(1928).
61. Symes v. Teagle, 67 Wn.2d 867, 410 P.2d 594 (1966).
62. Sanborn v. Dentler, 97 Wash. 149, 166 P. 62 (1917).
63. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 30(e).
64. Seattle-First National Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wn.2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
65. The procedure is set forth in WASH. CIV. R. SUPER. CT. 31. To avoid confusion
with written interrogatories to parties under federal rule 33, new federal rule 31 is
entitled, "Depositions Upon Written Questions". A principal change in new federal
rule 31 is to extend the time for service of cross, redirect and recross questions to
more realistic lengths.
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the oral examination in that the examiner can adapt his questioning to
the answers and thereby make a more searching and thorough in-
quiry, depositions upon written questions for discovery are seldom
used. However, if the facts sought are few, simple and of a formal
nature, or if the deposition is to be taken at a distance for which the
expense of an oral examination is not justified, this device may be
useful. 6 6
4. Use of Depositions
Civil Rule 26(d) states the uses that may be made of depositions at
the trial or upon the hearing of a motion. Probably the most common
use is for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of
the deponent as a witness under subsection 26(d)(1).6 7
In addition, subsection (2) of rule 26(d) provides that the deposi-
tion of a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. This
includes impeachment and the introduction of substantive evidence. It
is not mandatory, however, for the trial court to admit a party's depo-
sition whenever it is offered in evidence by his opponent.68 Thus, if
the party is present and testifies, the court might refuse to allow the
reading of his deposition by his opponent when it does not contradict
or materially differ from his testimony. 69 On the other hand, a trial
court might, without its constituting reversible error, admit a deposi-
tion of an opponent for substantive purposes even though the oppo-
nent is present. Basically, the use of the opponent's deposition seems
to rest in the discretion of the trial court.7 0
Finally, subsection (3) provides for the use of a deposition of a wit-
ness, whether or not a party, for any purpose in certain defined in-
stances, such as death of the witness, residence out of the county and
more than 20 miles from the place of trial, and inability of the witness
to attend because of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment. Unlike
66. See Nasser v. Gaston, 70 Wash. 685, 127 P. 470(1912).
67. An excellent illustration of the effect of such usage is Hurst v. Washington
Canners Co-op, 50 Wn.2d 729, 314 P.2d 651 (1957).
68. Kellogg v. Wilcox, 46 Wn.2d 558, 283 P.2d 677 (1955).
69. See Lashbrook v. Spokane-Wallace Stages, Inc., 168 Wash. 24, 10 P.2d 241
(1932).
70. See Young v. Liddington, 50 Wn.2d 78, 309 P.2d 761 (1957); Vannoy v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., 59 Wn.2d 623. 369 P.2d 848 (1962).
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subsection (2), subsection (3) is predicated upon the unavailability of
the particular deponent-witness. 71
A problem arises under the provision of subsection (3) allowing for
the use of a deposition of a witness in the event "that the witness re-
sides out of the county and more than 20 miles from the place of trial,
unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the
party offering the deposition." The problem is whether "absence" in
the "unless" clause means absence from the county and more than
twenty miles from the place of trial, or absence from the trial. For
example, suppose counsel offers the deposition of his party, or a man-
aging agent of his party, or a friendly witness, any one of whom re-
sides out of the county and more than 20 miles from the place of trial,
but whose presence at the trial could be obtained if the party wished.
Has absence of the witness been procured in violation of the rule so as
to preclude admissibility? The Washington court has held not, in
accord with federal authority.72 The "unless" clause has reference to
procuring absence from the county, not the trial.
In addition to meeting the above stated requirements, the part of
the deposition sought to be used at the trial must be admissible under
the rules of evidence.73 While a party does not make a person his own
witness by taking his deposition, the introduction in evidence of any
part of a deposition for any purpose other than that of contradicting
or impeaching the deponent makes the deponent his witness, unless
the deponent is the adverse party.74 Finally, if only part of a deposi-
tion is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require
71. Vannoy v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 59 Wn.2d 623, 369 P.2d 848 (1962);
Kellogg v. Wilcox, 46 Wn.2d 558, 283 P.2d 677 (1955).
72. Aircraft Radio Industries, Inc. v. M.V. Palmer, Inc., 45 Wn.2d 737, 277
P.2d 737 (1954).
73. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(e) and 26(d) (first paragraph). Thus, while at
the taking of a deposition it is not ground for objection that the testimony will be
inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence, the rules of evidence do apply at the trial
itself.
See State Bank of Clarkston v. Morrison, 85 Wash. 182, 147 P. 875 (1915), de-
cided under earlier statutes, to the effect that a general objection to the reading of a
deposition of a witness at the time it was offered in evidence, without basing the
objection upon some specific ground of inadmissibility, waives the necessity of the
opposing party proving that the deposition was authorized.
74. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(f). See Von Tobel v. Stetson & Post Mill Co.,
32 Wash. 683, 73 P. 788 (1903), decided under earlier statutes.
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him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and
any party may introduce any other parts.7 5
5. Costs
The expense of taking depositions may be considerable and, conse-
quently, the question of who bears that expense is important. When the
present discovery rules were adopted in 1951, it was provided that
"No cost or expense of taking a deposition of a witness, nor of the
transcription or certification of testimony shall be taxed as costs or
disbursements. ' ' 76 That provision was abrogated, effective in 1953. To
be considered is a statutory provision which states in part, " [t] he pre-
vailing party ... shall also be allowed for all necessary disbursements,
including... the necessary expenses of taking depositions .... 77
In Platts v. Arney78 the defendant took the depositions of two wit-
nesses, not parties to the action. The witnesses were present and testi-
fied at the trial. One of the depositions was used in cross-examination,
but neither was used for the purpose of introducing testimony. The
court noted that at the time the above statute was adopted a pretrial dis-
covery deposition was not authorized. Consequently, it was held that
the statute did not authorize taxing, as costs, expenses incurred by a
party taking a deposition of a witness for discovery purposes. The
same principle applies to a pretrial discovery deposition of the op-
posing party.7 9
On the other hand, costs may be allowed under the statute for dep-
ositions taken not for discovery purposes, but for use at the trial.
Thus, it is proper to allow costs to the prevailing party for traveling
expense incurred by his counsel in taking out-of-state depositions. 8 0
Further, if a deposition is actually introduced into evidence at the
trial, the court will not presume that it was not taken for that purpose.8 '
75. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 26(d)(4). For an application of the rule see Symes
v. Teagle, 67 Wn.2d 867, 410 P.2d 594 (1966). For a case under earlier statutes see
Harris v. Saunders, 108 Wash. 195. 182 P. 949 (1919).
76. The provision was WASH. R. PLEAD., PRAC., PROC., 26(g).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.090 (1961).
78. 46 Wn.2d 122, 278 P.2d 657 (1955).
79. Arnesen v. Rowe, 46 Wn.2d 718, 284 P.2d 329 (1955); Kenworthy v. Klein-
berg, 182 Wash. 425, 47 P.2d 825 (1935); Victor Products Corp. v. Edwards. 172
Wash. 1, 18 P.2d 1045 (1933).
80. Duplanty v. Matson Navigation Co.. 53 Wn.2d 434, 333 P.2d 1092 (1959).
81. Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge of Washington and Its Jurisdiction.
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B. Interrogatories to Parties
Another method of discovery is that one party may serve written
interrogatories upon any adverse party.82 Interrogatories may be served
after commencement of the action and without leave of court, except
that, if service is made by the plaintiff within 10 days after such
commencement, leave of court granted with or without notice must
first be obtained. The interrogatories are to be answered within 15
days or objected to within 10 days with a notice of hearing.
New federal rule 33 makes a number of changes. The time limit for
answering or objecting has been extended to 30 days after the service
of the interrogatories, except that a defendant may serve answers or
objections within 45 days after service of the summons and complaint
upon him. With the increased time for answering, the plaintiff is no
longer required to obtain leave of court before submitting interrogato-
ries, thereby allowing him to do so together with the summons and
complaint. Another change is that interrogatories are no longer re-
stricted to "adverse" parties, but may be served on any other party.
Under the Washington rule the objecting party has the burden of
noting the matter for hearing. Under the amended federal rule the
burden is on the interrogating party to move under rule 37(a) for a
court order compelling answers, at which time the court will rule on
the objections. This change in the burden of going forward does not,
however, alter the obligation of an objecting party to justify his objec-
tions.
The Washington rule provides that interrogatories may relate to
any matters which can be inquired into under rule 26(b), thereby
raising the issues of relevancy and privilege previously discussed. The
trial court has considerable discretion in determining what may be
inquired into through interrogatories.83 An important change in the
new federal rule is that it is made clear that an interrogatory is not
necessarily objectionable merely because an answer involves an
opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to
F. & A.M. v. Most Worshipful John A. Bell Grand Lodge of Washington, A.F. & A.M.,
62 Wn.2d 28, 381 P.2d 130 (1963). For a good summary of the rules as to costs see
Gabel v. Koba, I Wn.App. 684, 463 P.2d 237 (1969).
82. WASH. CIv. R. SUPER. CT. 33.
83. See Weber v. Biddle, 72 Wn.2d 22, 431 P.2d 705 (1967), which affirmed a
trial court order sustaining objections to interrogatories asking for all information upon
which a motion to vacate a judgment was based. 3A L. ORLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE
25 (2d ed., Supp. 1970). Orland suggests the case may be "unduly restrictive."
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fact. This is a matter upon which the federal courts had split and
which is not clearly answered in Washington at present.
To the extent that parties can inquire into contentions, the an-
swering party must be careful, as he may find his proof limited at the
trial by his answers. In a wife's action against a manufacturer and
seller of a tractor for the wrongful death of her husband who was
killed while operating the tractor, the defendant sent interrogatories
requesting the plaintiff to delineate in detail each physical and me-
chanical characteristic which caused her husband to be injured. 84 The
plaintiffs answers did not mention the failure to place a curved bar on
the hood of the tractor. The court of appeals held the trial court's re-
fusal to admit evidence on behalf of the plaintiff on the matter was
not an abuse of discretion. The guiding considerations were said to be
whether there is prejudice to the party who propounded the interroga-
tories and whether the answering party has a satisfactory explanation
of the failure to answer correctly.
Another problem which may present itself to the answering party is
whether he has a duty to supplement or amend his answers upon the
basis of information received later. In another recent court of appeals
case85 the defendant sent interrogatories to the plaintiff requesting the
names of witnesses. The plaintiff answered, listing 23 witnesses. Later
the plaintiff contacted an expert witness, but did not provide his name
to the defendant. The trial court's refusal to allow the witness to tes-
tify was held to be error upon the ground that interrogatories under
Civil Rule 33 are not continuing unless specifically stated to be so.
Under the new federal rules, however, there would clearly be a duty
to provide the name of the expert witness. New rule 26(e) clarifies the
extent of the continuing duty of the responding party not only as to
interrogatories but also as to questions in depositions and as to re-
quests for inspection and admission. It is provided that a party who
has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response with
information thereafter acquired, with three exceptions. A party is
under a duty to supplement his response with respect to any question
addressed to the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
discoverable matters and the identity of each person expected to be
84. Stark v. Allis-Chalmers, 2 Wn.App. 399, 467 2d 854 (1970).
85. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stromme, 4 Wn.App. 85, 479 P.2d 554(1971).
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called as an expert witness at trial and the subject matter on which he
is expected to testify. Second, a party who knows or later learns that
his response is incorrect is under a duty to correct the response. Third,
a duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the court,
agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through requests
for supplementation of prior responses.
One other addition to federal rule 33, a subdivision entitled "option
to produce business records," is noteworthy. Interrogatories some-
times require a burdensome and expensive search of business records
in order to provide an answer. The new subdivision provides the re-
sponding party with the option of specifying the records from which
the answer may be derived and allowing the other party reasonable
opportunity to examine and make copies of the records. The option is
limited to those instances in which "the burden of deriving or ascer-
taining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the
interrogatory as for the party served. '86
C. Production of Documents and Things
Upon motion of any party showing good cause and upon notice to
all other parties, the court may order a party to produce and permit
the inspection of any designated documents, papers, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which contain evidence within the scope of
examination as provided in rule 26(b) and which are in the party's
possession, custody or control.87 Likewise, the court may order any
party to permit entry upon designated land for the purpose of inspect-
ing it.
The federal procedure for obtaining discovery of documents has been
considerably changed by new federal rule 34. Instead of a motion, the
party seeking discovery serves a request upon the other party. The
request may be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the
action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons
and complaint upon that party. The party upon whom the request is
served must serve a written response within 30 days after the service
of the request, except that a defendant may serve a response within 45
days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. The re-
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
87. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 34.
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sponse must state either that inspection is permitted or that there is an
objection and the reason therefor. The party making the request may
move for a court order under rule 37(a) following any objection or
other failure to respond or to permit inspection. Thus, whereas under
the Washington rule a court order is required, under the new federal
rule inspection of documents, as with depositions and interrogatories,
operates extrajudicially unless there is an objection.
The new federal rule also removes the requirement that the party
seeking discovery show "good cause." As will be recalled, trial prepa-
ration materials are treated separately in federal rule 26(b)(3), with
the required special showing previously discussed. With such matters
removed from rule 34, no reason was seen to continue the require-
ment of "good cause" as to ordinary documents and things. Rather
they are subject to the same conditions for examination as depositions
and written interrogatories, that is, relevant and non-privileged. 8s
In Washington, the "good cause" requirement remains. In the
leading case of Gooldy v. Golden Grain Trucking Co.,89 the trial
court refused to require the defendant to produce a statement given by
the defendant to his insurance carrier shortly after the date of the ac-
cident in question. The ground for production stated by the plaintiff
in his motion under rule 34 was that at the time of the defendant's
deposition he indicated he had had only one drink whereas the infor-
mation furnished the carrier indicated that he was in a substantially
intoxicated condition. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed upon
the basis that there was no showing of good cause, since plaintiff
made no showing of lack of cooperation, evasiveness, hostility, or in-
consistency in defendant's deposition to indicate that the contents of
the statement to the carrier were inconsistent with his deposition. The
"good cause" requirement was deemed to make the production of
documents more restrictive than other types of discovery.
Another new provision is federal rule 30(b)(5), which provides that
a notice to a party deponent of the taking of his deposition may be
accompanied by a request to produce documents and things in com-
pliance with rule 34. In Washington a subpoena may be used to
compel a person to produce documents at the taking of his deposition.9"
88. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTES, supra note 18, Rule 34.
89. 69 Wn.2d 610, 419 P.2d 582 (1966).
90. WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 45(d)(1).
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Presumably, the subpoena may issue against a party as well as a
nonparty.91 Finally, it should be noted that as to a nonparty, a sub-
poena must be used in both state and federal courts to obtain the pro-
duction of documents regardless of whether the documents are desired
at the taking of a deposition or otherwise, since rule 34 applies only as
to parties. 92
D. Physical and Mental Examinations
Long before the adoption of present Civil Rule 35 in Washington it
had been possible under limited circumstances to obtain a physical
examination of a party either as a result of the inherent powers of the
courts93 or under statutory authorization.9 4 Nevertheless, the rule sub-
stantially enlarged the scope of the authority of the trial court to order
a physical examination. 95 Under rule 35 the court may order a party
to submit to a physical or mental examination in any action in which
the condition of the party is in controversy. There must be a motion
with a showing of good cause and with notice to the party to be exam-
ined and to all other parties. The issuance of the order rests in the dis-
cretion of the trial court.96-
Upon request, the party examined under the Washington rule is
entitled to a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physi-
cian setting out his- findings and conclusions. 97 If such request and
91. See State ex rel. Schoenwald v. Superior Court, 189 Wash. 241, 64 P.2d 791
(1937); In re Bolster, 59 Wash. 655, 110 P. 547 (1910). See also 2 L. ORLAND, WASH-
INGTON PRACTICE § 174, at 54 (2d ed., Supp. 1970):
Strictly considered documents cannot be demanded in connection with Rule 33
interrogatories. Such is the prevailing federal practice. However, in Washington,
documents can be demanded by deposition subpoena, on oral or written depo-
sitions. Under such circumstances, the production of documents can be forced
without an application to the court and, as a practical matter, the existence
of such an alternative device may impel a party to produce documents in
response to a demand accompanying Rule 33 interrogatories.
92. See WASH. Civ. R. SUPER. CT. 45(b).
93. See Lane v. Spokane Falls & Northern Ry. Co., 21 Wash.. 119, 57 P. 367
(1899).
94. WASH. REv. CODE § 5.32.010, adopted in 1915 and repealed in 1957 after the
adoption of the present discovery rules.
95. Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 312 P.2d 640 (1957).
96. Beagle v. Beagle, 57 Wn.2d 753, 359 P.2d 808 (1961). Beagle held that in an
action to modify a divorce decree and obtain custody of minor children, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to compel the mother to submit
to a mental examination.
97. Under the amended federal rule 35, he is also entitled to the results of all
tests made and diagnoses, "together with like reports of all earlier examinations of
the same condition."
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delivery are made, two consequences occur. First, the other party is
entitled upon request to receive from the party examined a like report
of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same mental
or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such
report, the court may order delivery on such conditions as are just,
and if a physician fails to make such a report the court may exclude
his testimony at the trial. 98 Second, the party examined waives any
privilege he may have regarding the testimony of every other person
who has examined him or may thereafter examine him in respect of
the same condition.
Amendments to federal rule 35 extend the provisions to include not
only parties but also persons in the custody or under the legal control
of a party.99 Furthermore, an amendment expressly includes the deter-
mination of blood group within the kinds of examinations that can be
ordered under the rule.
E. Admission of Facts
After commencement of an action a party may serve upon any
other party a written request for the admission of the genuineness of
any relevant documents or of the truth of any relevant matters of
fact. 10 0 If the plaintiff desires to serve a request within 10 days after
commencement of the action, leave of court must be obtained. The
matters are deemed admitted unless the party responds within 10 days
either by a sworn statement denying the matters or by stating the rea-
sons why they cannot truthfully be admitted or denied, or by written
objections and a notice of hearing on the objections.
As elsewhere in the new federal rules, the time for responding has
been extended. 0 1 The party has 30 days except that a defendant need
98. The determination of whether the testimony of the doctor should be excluded
rests in the discretion of the trial court. See Davis v. Sill, 55 Wn.2d 477, 348 P.2d
215 (1960), in which plaintiff's doctor was allowed to testify although he had not
supplied a copy of his report to the defendant, where the court found there was no
intention on the part of the plaintiff to violate the rule and the testimony of the doc-
tor was not a surprise to the defendant as to any new issues in the case.
99. Presu'mably the Washington rule applies to a defendant as well as a plaintiff
under appropriate circumstances. The federal rule has been so interpreted. See
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379. U.S. 104 (1964). Cf. State ex rel. Nelson v. Superior
Court, 15 Wn.2d 407, 131 P.2d 144 (1942).
100. WASh. CIv. R. SUPER. Ci. 36.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
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not respond until 45 days after service of the summons and complaint
upon him. Also, the plaintiff may now serve requests for admissions
with the summons and complaint and need not obtain leave of court.
Another procedural change is that the federal rule places the burden
of moving for a hearing on an objection on the party requesting an
order. Under the Washington rule the burden is on the objecting
party. The federal rule does not, however, change the burden of per-
suasion on the objections themselves.
Admissions serve at least two very useful purposes: narrowing the
issues, and facilitating proof with respect to the issues that remain.
The Washington rule limits these possibilities to "matters of fact."'102
The federal rule is broader and includes matters "that relate to state-
ments or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact.' 10 3
The federal rule also serves to clarify some matters about which the
federal courts were divided and which appear to remain unanswered
in Washington. A party who believes that a matter of which an admis-
sion has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on
that ground alone, object to the request. Further, a party may not give
lack of information or knowledge as reason for failure to admit or
deny unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry. 04 Finally,
the federal rule clarifies some doubt as to the effect of an admission by
providing that the matter admitted is conclusively established unless
the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admis-
sion. The court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the pre-
102. See Weyerhaeuser Sales Co. v. Holden, 32 Wn.2d 714, 203 P.2d 685 (1949),
wherein a request for admission was held not to comply with the rule where it re-
quested that each allegation in certain paragraphs of the reply be admitted as true,
such allegations consisting of a mixture of facts, conclusions and argumentative
statements.
A special point to note is that while the failure to answer a request to admit having
made a certain statement constitutes an admission that the statement was made, it is
not an admission that the statement is true. If the party has otherwise denied the truth
of the statement, summary judgment cannot be entered. Salvino v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 64 Wn.2d 795, 394 P.2d 366 (1964); Phillips v. Richmond, 59 Wn.2d 571, 369
P.2d 299 (1962).
103. This is similar to the provision in new federal rule 33 that an interrogatory
is not necessarily objectionable because an answer involves "an opinion or contention
that relates to fact or the application of law to fact."
104. Cf. City of Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 60 Wn.2d 105, 371 P.2d 1009
(1962). Kaltenbach stands for the proposition that a general denial based upon lack
of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief is insufficient to raise an
issue as to the existence of matters of public record. Where such a denial was made
in response to a request for admission of the genuineness of certain documents of
record, the genuineness of the documents was deemed admitted.
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sentation of the merits of the action will be served and the party who
obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that he will be preju-
diced. 105
IV. SANCTIONS
Civil Rule 37 sets forth the sanctions available in the event of a
failure to comply with the rules of discovery. If a party or other depo-
nent refuses to answer a question upon oral examination, refuses to
answer an interrogatory under rule 31, or refuses to answer an inter-
rogatory under rule 33, the court may on motion order an answer and
provide for the payment of reasonable expenses. If a party or other
witness fails to comply with such order he may be considered in con-
tempt of court. Further, if a party refuses to obey such order, or an
order under rule 34 to produce a document, or an order under rule 35
to submit to a physical examination, the court may (among other
things) enter an order that designated facts shall be taken as estab-
lished, or an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support
or oppose designated claims or defenses, or an order striking plead-
ings or dismissing the action or rendering a judgment by default. If a
party denies a request for admission of the truth of certain facts which
are thereafter proved to be true, he may be required to pay the other
party his reasonable expenses in making such proof. Finally, if a party
wilfully fails to appear for the taking of his deposition or fails to serve
answers to interrogatories under rule 33, the court may strike his
pleadings, or dismiss the action, or enter a judgment of default against
such party.
A principal case illustrating the application of rule 37 is Mitchell v.
Watson.t06 In a libel action the defendant refused to answer interroga-
tories directed to the matter of who had supplied the defendant with
certain information. The trial court adjudged the defendant to be in
contempt of court, struck the defendant's answer and entered a judg-
ment of default except as to damages. The trial was continued as to
damages but the defendant was prohibited from participating, and the
plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees of $200. The appellate court al-
105. The federal rule removes the requirement that answers to requests for
admissions be by a sworn statement of the party. Rather, they may simply be signed
by either the party or his attorney.
106. 58 Wn.2d 206, 361 P.2d 744 (1961).
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lowed the award of attorney's fees to stand, but set aside the judgment
of default and reinstated the answer. The court stated that while it
would be proper for the trial court to presume certain facts relating to
the interrogatories to be true, it was improper to enter a judgment
against the defendant as to all issues and to preclude the defendant
from otherwise participating.
While there were constitutional implications in Mitchell, the result
is nevertheless representative of the decisions interpreting the sanc-
tions rule. While the matter is primarily within the discretion of the
trial judge who is empowered with means of enforcing the discovery
rules, the tendency is to be lenient with violations and to attempt to
reach the trial on the merits.' 07 Thus, it has been held that the provi-
sion for striking a pleading of a party for failure to answer an interro-
gatory should be considered an extreme penalty to be invoked only in
the case of a wilful failure to answer.10 8 Similarly, the court found no
error in a trial court's refusal to strike the defendant's affirmative de-
fenses and hold him liable as a matter of law even though the de-
fendant failed to answer interrogatories until after the plaintiff had
moved to strike the defenses.' 09 Nor was it an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to refuse to strike a complaint because written interro-
gatories submitted by the defendant to the plaintiff were not answered
until the day before trial, where it did not appear that the defendant
was prejudiced by the delay.11
While the extreme penalty of dismissal of the action or a default
judgment is seldom imposed, an appropriate occasion may arise.
Thus, it was held not to be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
dismiss an action where the defendant had moved for judgment of
dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to answer interrogatories and re-
quests for admission of facts, the trial court had at first denied
such motion on condition that the plaintiff pay to the defendant's
counsel the sum of $150 costs and attorney's fees within 10 days, and
107. See 37 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1962).
108. Cameron v. Boone, 62 Wn.2d 420, 383 P.2d 277 (1963).
109. Phillips v. Richmond, 59 Wn.2d 571, 369 P.2d 299(1962).
110. Kagele v. Frederick, 43 Wn.2d 410, 261 P.2d 699 (1953), noted in 29 WASH.
L. REV. 143 (1954). The case was decided under a statute existing before the present
discovery rules.
Other pre-rule cases are McDonald v. McDonald, 119 Wash. 396, 206 P. 23 (1922);
Saar v. Weeks, 105 Wash. 628, 178 P. 819 (1919); Capps v. Frederick, 44 Wash. 38,
86 P. 1128 (1906); and Lawson v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 44 Wash. 26,
86 P. 1120 (1906).
437
Washington Law Review
the plaintiff had failed to do so. 1 1 ' And, of course, lesser sanctions will
more readily be imposed. If a party denies knowledge of witnesses
who are later produced, the surprised party may properly move that
they not be permitted to testify or that a continuance be granted to
permit an opportunity to obtain rebuttal evidence.1 12 Likewise, attor-
ney's fees may be allowed to a party who is required to prove the truth
of matters denied by the other party in response to a request for ad-
missions when there is no good reason for the denial.' 13
The guiding principle is justice in applying sanctions for failure to
comply with the discovery rules. Though an unwillingness to impose
the harsher sanctions may encourage or at least allow for a greater
avoidance of the rules, the tendency of the courts, as stated, seems to
be to avoid the extreme sanctions. A party in seeking enforcement
might therefore be wise to move alternatively for lesser relief when
seeking such matters as a dismissal or default in order to assure that
his motion is not totally lost.
The federal rule" 4 is strengthened in several ways by the 1970
amendments. One amendment makes it clear that an evasive or in-
complete answer in a deposition or in response to an interrogatory is
to be treated as a failure to answer. On the matter of expenses (in-
cluding attorney's fees) to be awarded to the prevailing party when a
motion is made for an order compelling discovery, the Washington
rule provides for an award only if the losing party is found to have
acted without substantial justification. The amended federal rule re-
quires an award unless the conduct of the losing party is found to
have been substantially justified. The change in emphasis is intended
to encourage judges to more readily grant an award of expenses. 1 5
The Washington requirement that the failure to appear for a deposi-
tion or to answer an interrogatory be "wilful" before sanctions can be
imposed has been removed for federal courts. On the other hand, the
sanctions are to be such as are "just," thereby allowing for less than
dismissal or default if the failure is other than wilful.
I1l. Vistad v. Luketa, 46 Wn.2d 213, 279 P.2d 922 (1955).
112. See Sather v. Lindahl, 43 Wn.2d 463, 261 P.2d 682 (1953) where the
deceived party waited until the argument to the jury began and then moved for a
mistrial. This was held to be too late.
113. Clausing v. Kassner, 60 Wn.2d 12, 371 P.2d 633 (1962). The requesting
party must prove the truth of the matters for which admission was requested before he
may obtain his expenses. Dellit v. Perry, 60 Wn.2d 287, 373 P.2d 792 (1962).
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
115. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTES, supra note 18, Rule 37.
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CONCLUSION
Most of the law concerning discovery which is not included in the
rules is made at the trial court level rather than through appellate de-
cisions. This results from the fact that discovery rulings are almost
never appealable. Rather they are interlocutory in nature, thereby
requiring a final judgment before an appeal can be taken.16
As has been recognized by the court, this means that, realistically,
the opportunity for appellate review is often illusory. 17 If discovery
should have been allowed by the trial court but was denied, there is
little an appellate court can do once the issues have been decided on
the merits. By the time the appellate court hears the case, the denial
will be treated as harmless error. On the other hand, if discovery is
ordered when it should have been denied, the disclosure has occurred,
and again, an appellate determination that this was error is of no
practical value. Furthermore, even if error is assigned on appeal from
a final judgment, it is likely, as evidenced throughout this article, that
the appellate court will treat the matter as within the discretion of the
trial judge.
The combination of nonappealability and review of only alleged
abuses of discretion means that trial judges are generally free to go
their own way on discovery issues. If guidance is to be provided, and
uniformity is to be achieved, it must be primarily through the rules
rather than appellate decisions. In several areas the recent amend-
ments to the federal rules provide that guidance considerably better
than do the present rules in Washington, and for that reason alone
consideration should be given to their adoption.
116. See State ex rel. Smith v. Jones, 149 Wash. 614, 271 P. 1005 (1928); State
ex rel. Seattle General Contract Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Wash. 649, 106 P. 150
(1910). One method whereby an appeal might be expedited is a refusal to comply
with an order of discovery thereby resulting in a contempt order. Admittedly, this is
a harsh method. See State ex rel. Mangaoang v. Superior Court, 30 Wn.2d 692, 193
P.2d 318 (1948). This case held that while an order for the inspection of papers is
not a final order from which an appeal can be taken, an order of contempt for re-
fusal to comply with such order is appealable. See also State ex rel. Hayashi v. Ronald,
134 Wash. 152, 235 P. 21 (1925).
117. Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wn.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
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